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BOOK REVIEWS
THE SHREVEPORT PLAN: AN EXPERIMENT IN THE DELIVERY OF
LEGAL SERVICES. By F. RAYMOND MARKS, ROBERT P. HALLAUER, and
RICHARD R. CLIFTON. Chicago, Illinois: American Bar Foundation
1974, xi + 95 pages.
JUDICARE: PUBLIC FUNDS, PRIVATE LAWYERS, AND POOR PEOPLE.
BY SAMUEL J. BRAKEL. Chicago, Illinois: American Bar Foundation
1974, xi + 145 pages.
MARJORIE GIRTH*
During the 1960's, this country's programs providing publicly-
funded legal services to the poor were significantly expanded. Ob-
servers have since perceived the need to increase the availability of
legal services for another substantial group: those whose incomes
were too high to be eligible for the free service, but too low to af-
ford counsel at the going market rate. The response to that need
was based in part upon the obvious inequity of having counsel avail-
able for "the rich" and "the poor," but not for those in middle in-
come brackets. In addition, "no-fault" legislation, by reducing the com-
pensation of private counsel, caused lawyers to consider ways of de-
veloping new markets for legal service.
Meanwhile, the public programs which operated on a salaried
staff basis were being swamped by their caseloads. Public defenders
and Office of Equal Opportunity lawyers were faced with both limited
budgets and the responsibility of representing all clients who met
their standards of eligibility for service. The use of private practi-
tioners to represent the poor was an obvious alternative as a delivery
system.
The Shreveport Plan and Judicare provide interim evaluations
of two experiments with new delivery systems. The Shreveport Plan
reports the results of field research carried on through the initial
year's operation of the first "legal insurance" experiment undertaken
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in this country. Judicare describes experience with the model which
relies upon private attorneys who submit vouchers for government
payment after they have completed the work in each case. Both ex-
periments use the "open-panel" system of choosing lawyers, so that
clients are theoretically free to approach any member of the private
bar for help with their problems. Each study focuses upon the reac-
tions of eligible individuals and participating attorneys to the pros-
pect and reality of increased service.
The Shreveport plan was designed for Local 229 of the Laborers
International Union of North America. Funding for the four-year
experiment was based upon a two-cents-per-hour contribution by the
union's members, with the Ford Foundation guaranteeing to cover
any deficit. The plan began operating in January, 1971, and provided
maximum annual benefits for consultation, office work, and litiga-
tion in both civil and criminal matters.'
The authors' assessment of clients' reactions to the plan is based
upon interviews with 301 men who were members of the union in
both July, 1970, and January, 1972.2 The respondents were almost
exclusively blacks, employed as unskilled labor in an urban setting.
Because of the short-term focus of this study, the data which Marks,
Hallauer, and Clifton analyze cannot be considered definitive. Fol-
low-up data are needed to assess actual cost and to make more accurate
projections of the union members' longer-term use of lawyers.8
The Shreveport authors alternate between realistic acknowledg-
ments of the data's limitations and less-substantiated hopes for the
long-term impact of legal insurance plans. They predict not only that
clients may become more sophisticated about the appropriate use of
lawyers, but that these plans will help clients become more autonomous
1. For the details of the coverage of this plan, see F. MARKs, R. HALLAUER &
R. CLIFTON, THE SHREVEPORT PLAN 8-9 (1974) [hereinafter cited as THE SHREVEPORT
PLAN].
2. The authors note that approximately 1,000 people are members of the union
in any one year, but that membership fluctuates because of the uneven demands for
unskilled labor. Id. at 14 n.4, 59. An earlier published summary of preliminary research
findings in this study produced a valuable methodological critique which should be
heeded by designers of future field experiments. Getzman, A Critique of the Report of
the Shreveport Experiment, 3 J. LEGAL STUDIES 487 (1974); Hallauer, The Shreve-
port Experiment in Prepaid Legal Services, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 223 (1973).
3. For an analysis of intake and lawyers' claims which were paid through 1972,
see BAR ACTIVITIES COMMITTEE, SHREVEPORT BAR ASSOCIATION, PREPAID LEGAL SERV-
ICE PLAN: A COMPILATION OF THE BASIC DOCUMENTS (undated).
BOOK REVIEW
individuals. As a result, they foresee that the mutual views of lawyers
and clients as groups may even change for the better.4
Less idealistic goals for such plans might include easier access
to lawyers and higher-priority handling of the client's problem be-
cause it is no longer a charity case. From this perspective, the initial
data should be encouraging to those who might be considering similar
experiments elsewhere. The frequency of clients' perceptions of
lawyers as problem-solvers increased, and three-quarters of them indi-
cated a willingness to participate in such a plan if it were offered at
the same cost by a private company. 5 Lawyers were also enthusiastic
about the amount of service which they could deliver under the plan,6
although readers may decide to discount some of the lawyers' en-
thusiasm since the Shreveport bar association volunteered for the ex-
periment. Even so, the results would suggest that further monitoring
of this program would be useful to those who have a long-term interest
in increasing the availability of competent counsel. 7
While endorsing the legal insurance concept, the authors wisely
refrain from claiming that Shroeveport's insurance plan provides the
best system for delivering legal service. Furthermore, they question
the practical limitations of "open-panel" insurance plans. The union's
members had previously relied heavily on referrals from friends and
relatives when they needed lawyers. During the first year of this ex-
periment, they turned to union officials for recommendations in ap-
proximately one-quarter of their cases.8 Lawyers who are planning
such experiments should consider the implications of the role of the
sponsoring organization as a source of referrals. Unless lawyers' sub-
ject-matter competencies are available to the public in a manner which
4. Chapter four of the report does provide a useful description of the organiza-
tion of the Shreveport bar. In doing so, it documents the psychological distance between
the almost exclusively white, male professionals and the segment of their clientele which
is black, male, and employed as unskilled labor.
5. THE SHREVEPORT PLAN 79, 82.
6. Id. at 87.
7. When the original experiment ended on January 31, 1975, the union decided
to continue the program as a service to its members. The members' contribution was
increased to three cents per hour. The "major legal" benefit was increased from 80 per-
cent of the first $1,000 in expenses exceeding the litigation benefit to 80 percent of the
first $2,500 of such expenses. The union replaced the Ford Foundation as the guarantor
of any deficit. Telephone interview with Henry Politz, member of the Shreveport Plan's
Board of Trustees, March 15, 1975.
8. THE SHREVEPORT PLAN 68.
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is easily usable, the Shreveport study indicates that sponsors' recom-
mendations will be requested. As a result, the unfettered choice which
is theoretically available under an "open-panel" plan will be con-
siderably narrowed.
Mr. Brakel's Judicare is much more assertive than the enthusi-
astic Shreveport study needed to be. The judicare model has been
discussed at least since 1964 when substantial public monies were first
provided for civil legal service. Those monies were overwhelmingly
committed to the salaried attorneys who provided service through
the Federal Legal Services Program. Judicare experiments were few
in number and funded almost entirely in rural areas.
Mr. Brakel's carefully documented report compares the judicare
programs in Wisconsin and Montana with the staff-counsel program
which serves Michigan's Upper Peninsula through a network of re-
gional offices. All three areas are predominantly rural with low popula-
tion density. Indians constitute a significant proportion of the popula-
tion served by the judicare programs, but are less visible in the Michi-
gan program area.9 Field research for this study occurred in 1971 and
1972, after these programs had been operating for at least four years.
Mr. Brakel minces no words in assessing the assumptions which
have been used to support the preference for staffed offices in publicly-
funded legal service programs. 10 Idealistic hopes of "eradicating pov-
erty" through the staffed offices have outdistanced even the opti-
mistic Shreveport authors' expectations. Simultaneously, opponents of
significant judicare experiments have cited rising medical costs under
publicly-funded delivery systems which utilize private practitioners.
Still, Mr. Brakel insists that we cannot continue to ignore data about
judicare's potential merely because we have political or personal in-
vestments in the staffed-office concept." At least we cannot do so un-
less we are willing to be recognized as hypocritical about our sup-
posed commitment to developing the best possible method for de-
livering civil legal service to the poor.
9. Details can be found in S. BRAKEL, JUDICARE 12-16 (1974).
10. Id. at 1-7.
11. The present legal service program has been under political attack almost from
its inception. In 1973, the American Bar Association Journal printed a summary of
Mr. Brakel's research. Brakel, The Case for Judicare, 59 A.B.A.J. 1407 (1973). The
emotional investment in the preservation of the program was exemplified by the re-
ponse to the summary. E.g., Letter from William R. Klaus & Robert W. Meserve to
Editor, 60 A.B.A.J. 144 (1974); Letter from John D. Robb to Editor, id. at 144, 152.
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In order to obtain publicly-funded service, the Michigan clients
were limited to the attorneys who happened to be on the staff when
their problems arose. By contrast, the client's ability to choose a lawyer
is emphasized as important to the success of the judicare model, as
it was in Shreveport. But lawyers were in much shorter supply in
these rural areas than they were in the Shreveport metropolis. A more
specific description of the practicing bar would have been useful, so
that one could assess how problems of geographical access to lawyers
might change in the foreseeable future. If the practicing lawyers in
these rural areas were closer to retirement age than is the bar in
general, difficulties in ensuring that counsel are available may require
supplemental staffing for a judicare system. On the other hand, it
would be important to know whether there is any evidence that the
existence of the judicare programs has drawn lawyers to these areas
or caused them to stay when they had options elsewhere.
One of the real strengths of Mr. Brakel's work is his candor in
assessing issues of research methodology and standards, as well as the
substantive responses to his own efforts. In taking this approach, he
establishes a highly desirable professional standard for those who may
try to refute his conclusions. For instance, he acknowledges the dif-
ficulty of using our current judicare experience as a basis for attempt-
ing definitive assessments of how the system would work in an urban
setting. He also clearly notes the limits of his data on such issues as
the comparative costs and amounts of "impact" litigation in the staffed
office and judicare programs.
Nonetheless, Mr. Brakel ultimately concludes that his data sup-
port the implementation of judicare as "the basis for the national
attempt to help the poor use legal resources."12 This conclusion is
based in large part upon two findings: (1) the available comparative
data do not rule out judicare on the basis of cost, and (2) his com-
parison of clients' responses to both the judicare and staffed-office
programs indicated that a substantially larger proportion of the judi-
care clients were satisfied with the service they received. Moreover,
a number of the satisfied staffed-office clients asserted that they would
have preferred a judicare format for legal assistance., 3
From another perspective, Mr. Brakel's conclusion is premised
12. S. BRAKEL, JUDICARE 128 (1974).
13. Id. at 91-110.
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upon the fact that proponents of continued staffed-office programming
have failed to substantiate their claims of superiority for their con-
cept. The change in delivery systems which Mr. Brakel proposes,
however, will be perceived as dramatic and radical. That perception,
together with the political realities of the investment to date in the
staffed-office programs, make the acceptance of a nationwide judicare
experiment unlikely at this time. But, at a minimum, the data in
Judicare argue for the objective evaluation of significant tests of the
system in urban settings if we have serious intentions of equalizing
the access to counsel for all of our citizens.
